The 15 members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are digesting a critical review of the structure and performance of its Secretariat, which describes the overall CARICOM integration initiative as being in crisis. This paper describes elements of the CARICOM integration project, and draws lessons for the Pacific Island Countries. It suggests that the CARICOM experience puts into question elements of the logic and overall approach to integration being pursued in both regions (and being urged by external partners).
Introduction
The Pacific Islands Forum is currently considering a critical review of the structure and performance of its Secretariat (Dornan 2012) . In considering institutional structures, the Forum is not alone: ASEAN Member States are also grappling with challenges concerning the performance of their Secretariat. 1 These review processes are part of a broader rethinking of the overall direction and approach to be taken to regional integration, a rethinking which must be factoring in the current crisis in Europe. This discussion paper looks at what is happening in the regional integration project being pursued by the members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which for a variety of reasons may be quite relevant to the Pacific Island States.
CARICOM comprises 12 island and three larger coastal states and territories that lie in or border the Caribbean Sea. Although many CARICOM members share cultural and historical similarities, there is considerable diversity among them, reflecting a range of African, Asian, European, and native influences. There are also differences in population, land area and levels of economic development. CARICOM includes high and middle income countries with significant oil, gas and mineral resources or well developed offshore banking sectors, as well as some of the poorest countries in the world, largely dependent on subsistence farming. It also includes some continental countries with relatively large land masses, as well as extremely small island states and territories.
( Table 1 gives a sense of the variation in size and wealth across CARICOM states and territories. It also shows how important trade in goods and services is to the economies of most CARICOM member states.)
The island members of CARICOM face some of the challenges usually associated with smallness and physical separation from continental land masses. They are very open to international trade and financial flows, and this openness makes them more exposed to external shocks than larger economies, and limits the instruments available to deal with these shocks. Small populations also increase the challenges of building and maintaining institutions, particularly those whose functionality is predicated on independence. This is an issue both in terms of the smaller pool of qualified personnel to run the full range of institutions of a modern state, but also due to the greater difficulties encountered in separating political, personal and institutional interests. 
Regional integration
The pursuit of regional integration in the Caribbean predates independence. Table 2 summarises the main elements of these initiatives.
In parallel with, and in some case predating these formal integration initiatives,
Caribbean countries created a range of regional institutions, including: the University of the West Indies; the Caribbean Court of Justice; the Caribbean Telecommunications Union; and the Caribbean Regional organisation for Standards and Quality (Appendix Table A .1 gives a larger but not exhaustive list of regional institutions). Girvan, 2010 The CARICOM regional integration project has received strong in principle support from the member states of the Community, and broad acceptance within the private sector and academia. However, there is growing disenchantment with progress actually being made. This comes on top of long-standing doubts about whether models of regional integration that are centred on trade liberalisation can deliver much in the way of development outcomes. 4
4 In a chapter of a report commissioned by the Caribbean Development Bank, University of West Indies Professor Norman Girvan observed that "… economic integration is still a work in progress, and what has been accomplished so far has not impacted significantly on regional economic development. This could be due to faulty implementation of agreed integration schemes, or to inappropriate design of the schemes Significant impediments to the right of establishment and free movement of goods, services, capital and labour remain to be addressed. 5
Macroeconomic coordination and convergence are far from being achieved: there are no rules for policy coordination and implementation, and the convergence criteria that had been set for creation of the monetary union remain largely unmet.
Little has been achieved in the way of development of common or coordinated sectoral policies.
The report also pointed to weaknesses in the institutional and governance structures for CARICOM and the CSME. Decisions are taken by consensus and through interthemselves, or to inherent limits in the capacity of economic integration per se to drive development in these economies" (Girvan 2010) . 5 CARICOM's CSME Unit reports on a study indicating that across all five regimes CARICOM member states had implemented 64 per cent of the required measures. The highest level of compliance was for the movement of goods (80 per cent) and the lowest for the movement of services (37 per cent) (CSME Unit 2012).
governmental cooperation and, with the exception of the Caribbean Court of Justice, none of the agencies or bodies created to support the integration process have been given supranational decision-making power. Additionally, CARICOM has not yet created instruments to enable Community decisions to become law.
A recently mandated study by CARICOM Heads of Government to offer proposals for restructuring the CARICOM Secretariat observed that CARICOM was in crisis (Stoneman et al 2012) . While this was seen as partially due to continuing economic retrenchment in the region caused to some extent by the 2008 global financial crisis and the fallout from the problems in Europe 6 , it was also due to long-standing frustration with the slow rate of progress and a serious weakening of the structure and operations of the Community. In turn, it linked the frustration back to the excessive ambition of the CARICOM agenda in the light of exogenous and endogenous constraints, which included:
 binding exogenous constraints due to geography (too many islands), market size and the inherent complexity (especially of the single market and economy agenda) of the integration project;
 endogenous problems such as the over-expansion of mandates, lack of coherence in the expansion of CARICOM institutions, and lack of functionality of many of these institutions, managerial and administrative weaknesses, including within the Secretariat; and  the perennial problem facing all regional initiatives: progress depends on member state level implementation and enforcement, and the political, legislative and administrative challenges of translating Community level decisions into practice-this in turn is linked to the absence of prioritisation and tendency to adopt too many mandates.
Hemispheric integration
In parallel with the CSME agenda, CARICOM members have been pursuing integration into the larger regional and hemispheric economy through agreements with other partners. CARICOM has negotiated trade agreements with Colombia, Cuba, Costa Rica, The successful conclusion of the negotiations notwithstanding, some proponents of Caribbean integration have argued that the negotiation of the EPA exposed the lack of a regional governance settlement for the Caribbean, and the failure of leaders and technocrats to seek buy in to the agreement (Bishop and Payne 2010) . Others have pointed out that the discussion within the Caribbean cast the agreement as a largely technocratic issue, when in fact it went to the heart of the political economy of integration for the region (Girvan 2009 ). In many areas the EPA has the capacity to supercede the CSME as a driver of change for CARICOM members, and the institutional arrangements set up to ensure progress and deal with disputes under the agreement have been seen as supplanting the regional structures that the Caribbean has endeavored to put in place. One commentator observed that "As a consequence the just concluded EPA has included in it administrative and organisational arrangements, which give EPA institutions a greater degree of "sovereignty" over the domestic economic affairs of CARICOM, than the Treaty of Chaguaramas, which established the Secretariat and organs of CARICOM does.
Since EPA bodies are jointly controlled by the EC and CARIFORUM Member
States this is clearly unacceptable" (Thomas 2008, p. 24) .
Lessons for the Pacific?
Are there lessons for the Pacific from the CARICOM experience with regional integration, and the factors that led to the conclusion that it is in crisis?
There are many differences between the members of the CARICOM Community and the Pacific Islands Countries (PICs), even though the two regions are often grouped together in thinking by other parts of the world and the development community. CARICOM members are physically much closer to the large markets with which they have long standing commercial ties, and none are as geographically fragmented as some PICs. (It is instructive to note that the greatest distance between the nine members of the OECS is half the distance of that which lies between the islands that are furthest apart of just one PIC, Solomon Islands.) Most CARICOM members are much better endowed with skills than PICs, and have a much stronger entrepreneurial base (Worrell and Fairbairn, 1995) . However, many countries in both regions face the challenges of size and dependence on air and sea transport for internal links and physical interactions with the rest of the world.
Importantly for the regional integration agenda, for both groups of countries the potential gains from regional trade liberalisation are not large: the prospects of a significant, growth enhancing expansion of inter-regional trade are limited. In 2001, Delisle Worrell noted:
"… Perhaps the weakest area of integration within the Caribbean has been trade … There are few complementarities that would make for intra-regional trade … Intra-regional trade is unlikely to assume major proportions … Inevitably trade will be mainly with the rest of the world, its pattern of growth determined by skills, investment and productivity and the rate at which the Caribbean adopts new techniques, the critical factor in international competitiveness" (Worrell 2001 , quoted in Hosein 2010 ).
Similar observations can be made about Pacific regional trade liberalisation (see, for example, Warner 2008). For both regions a more logical approach is to liberalise trade and investment with the rest of the world, or at the very least with the large markets with which trade in goods and services are and will be important for member countries.
But as the Caribbean and Pacific experience with the EPA shows, how this integration is approached is really critical. Unfortunately, the dynamic of trade agreements and how they are negotiated often flies in the face of a sensible approach to reaping the gains from liberalisation: they typically embody a mercantilist approach to trade and prioritise institutional and policy changes that are not high order issues for both sides of the table. While it is hard to see any case for Caribbean or Pacific economies to raise the costs of international trade and investment through policy based impediments, most of the benefits of reducing these impediments can be achieved through unilateral action.
For small states in the Caribbean and the Pacific, there ought to be larger gains from regional institutional integration and development of shared institutions, especially among the countries which share a common legal and institutional colonial legacy.
While this kind of integration has been part of the Caribbean regional agenda in the past, and continues to be pursued in some areas, the reluctance of some governments to cede sovereignty to regional institutions has constrained further progress. This stumbling block also seems to impede the adoption of common sectoral policies and regulatory systems that could lead towards the creation of a single economy. The clear exception to this is the OECS, whose members are part of a monetary union and share a number of institutions.
A key issue seems to be that where an institution directly or indirectly embodies or influences a distribution of costs and benefits, the parties to the creation of that institution have to be confident that its operation will lead to overall gains for the community. This probably becomes harder to ensure the larger and more disparate the members of that community are, or where culture and behavioural norms differ widely 7 .
Put together, these observations suggest that there is value in recalibrating approaches to regional integration. Many regional integration projects around the world have been strongly influenced by the European model, where integration of the regional market was the critical entry point in building confidence that would allow progressively deeper integration, including monetary and political union, with a significant allocation of power to central institutions. At the same time, Europe has used trade agreements with other countries and regions to pursue broader commercial interests and ensure market access.
It is not clear that the logic of this approach is very compelling for the Caribbean or the Pacific. For these regions, the gains from regional trade and investment liberalisation are small, and regional agreements do not deliver enough benefits to build confidence and support for a broader integration agenda. Collectively negotiating agreements with external partners is unlikely to be a good pathway to either strengthening regional coherence or reaping the gains from freer flows of trade and investment
This suggests that the case for regional policy cooperation and creation of shared institutions has to be sold on its own merits, and pathways must be developed to deal with the sovereignty issues. One lesson from the Caribbean is that subregional groupings with stronger cultural and historic ties can progress where larger panregional groupings struggle.
Another important lesson from the Caribbean lies in the challenge of matching the scope and ambition of the integration agenda to political and capacity realities. CARICOM has been strongly criticised for adopting mandates unmatched by implementation capacity.
7 It may be significant that the OECS monetary union and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank that manages the union were created before independence, whereas the CSME objective of monetary union has to be agreed to by a collection of independent nations with clearer notions of separate national interests.
Leaders of CARICOM countries have also admitted that much of the agenda has been driven in a top-down fashion: despite strong pan-Caribbean sentiment it has proved hard to convince citizens of member states of the merit of more intensive regionalism. 8
This has made it hard to translate decisions made regionally into national level practice.
8 See the lecture given to the Library of Congress by the former Prime Minister of Barbados (Arthur, 2007) 
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